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Abstract: This chapter explores the evolution and contribution of social economics to modern 
political economic analysis. It reviews the origins and early history of social economics, discusses 
more fully recent postwar social economics, and then identifies new themes in social economics’ 
current research agenda. Social economics is distinguished from classical political economy and 
contemporary neoclassical and mainstream economics – and, indeed, from most other political 
economic approaches – by its goal of explaining and premising the concept of ‘social’ in 
economics. Its main organising principle is that the economy is embedded in human society rather 
than vice versa.  Second, the chapter discusses social economists’ understanding of economic 
policy and their views about the relationship between ethics and economics. Their understanding 
of policy has two main dimensions: (i) the ‘moral limits of markets’ approach, regarding some 
domains of social life as ‘off limits’ to markets; and (ii) the ‘taming the market’ approach.  Third, 
the chapter moves to key methodological issues, including the social economics critique of the 
positive-normative distinction of mainstream economics and the positivist view that economics 
should practice value-neutrality in order to be a science.  Fourth, the chapter closes with a 
discussion of social economics’ main normative goals and social values.  
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This chapter first explores the evolution and contribution of social economics to modern political 
economic analysis. It first briefly reviews the origins and early history of social economics, 
discusses more fully recent postwar social economics as it has come to function as a distinct 
approach within contemporary political economy, and then identifies new themes in social 
economics’ current research agenda. Social economics is distinguished from classical political 
economy and contemporary neoclassical and mainstream economics – and, indeed, from most 
other political economic approaches – by its goal of explaining and premising the concept of 
‘social’ in economics. Its main organising principle is that the economy is embedded in human 
society rather than vice versa. Market processes are consequently understood as conditioned by 
social relationships, with the latter not reducible to economic relations.   Thus, human economic 
behavior involves a wide range of motivations and concerns that cannot be reduced to explanations 
of market behaviour alone.  
 
Second, the chapter discusses social economists’ understanding of economic policy and their views 
about the relationship between ethics and economics. Both concern the embeddedness relationship 
between society and markets. Their understanding of policy has two main dimensions: (i) the 
‘moral limits of markets’ approach, regarding some domains of social life as ‘off limits’ to markets 
and behavior driven by self-interest; and (ii) the ‘taming the market’ approach, aiming to use 
economic policy to improve social well-being by modifying how markets operate in society. Social 
economists’ views of the relationship between ethics and economics include an alternative vision 
of the place of ethics in economics, and also arguments regarding about how this relation may 
evolve in an interdisciplinary way in the future. 
 
Third, the chapter moves to key methodological issues, including the social economics critique of 
the positive-normative distinction of mainstream economics and the positivist view that economics 
should practice value-neutrality in order to be a science. It reviews the origins of these views in 
Hume’s is-ought distinction and outlines Putnam’s ‘entanglement’ thesis in response to Hume. It 
then links mainstream positivism to its understanding of the individual seen as Homo Economicus, 
before arguing that the social economics position that economics is value-laden is an important 
foundation for disciplinary pluralism that differs from other heterodox arguments for pluralism. 
 
Fourth, the chapter closes with a discussion of social economics’ main normative goals and social 
values. It distinguishes three main subjects of investigation in social economics and then identifies 
three corresponding areas of normative concern for social economists: the nature of well-being, 
values in economic relationships, and the moral status of the person in economic life.  
 
 
The origins and historical development of social economics 
 
Social economics as a distinct theoretical approach within political economy has two main 
connected histories. The first has its origins and initial development in Eighteenth Century 
European ‘third way’ cooperative movements – particularly in France, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy, and Britain, where early modern capitalism was ascendant. The literature arising 
from these movements grappled with explaining non-market, local types of economic relationships 
in broad social system terms. The second, more recent history involves the emergence and 
development of a professional academic social economics society and scholarly journals in the 
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United States and Canada in the second half of the Twentieth Century through to the new 
Millennium. The resulting literature focuses on confronting and resisting the market-centric 
economic analysis that has dominated economics since 1950, while advancing alternative 
foundations for a more humanistic economics.1 Post-millennium social economics thought has 
subsequently taken on new issues, normative concerns and voices, including from outside Europe 
and North America as capitalism has globalised.  
 
 
‘The first 200 years’ 
 
The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century development of social economics in Europe emerged in 
connection with investigation of the ‘social economy’ or what has come to be called the ‘third 
way’ or ‘third sector’ of modern capitalist market economies – the l’ économie sociale, 
Gemeinschaft or Sozialoekonomie. These are understood primarily as associational and 
cooperative forms of community-based economic activities.2 The state and market had become the 
dominant forms of economic activity in emerging capitalist economies. Yet, distinct from and 
intermediate between these two forms, there also existed a wide variety of different kinds of local 
economic activity that operated neither in terms of market-driven self-interest nor state-based 
broad national goals; instead, focusing on advancing local concerns. Early examples were craft 
and artisan guilds, farmers’ cooperatives, and mutual-aid societies. If the market and modern state 
were distinctive of post-feudal, national capitalist economies, what became the third sector 
following their emergence also had its antecedents in transitional pre-capitalist economies, as well 
as in feudalism when most economic activity remained local.  
 
Thus, whereas (classical) political economy developed primarily around the two more dominant 
forms of economic activity characterising capitalism, social economics simultaneously developed 
around the third – albeit remaining less widely recognised. Nitsch (1987) distinguishes three 
strands of social economic thought as it developed in Europe over the next two centuries: secular-
positive, secular-normative, and religious-normative. Seeking an alternative conception of 
economic systems, this literature was often highly philosophical. Nitsch includes as leading early 
figures Quesnay, J.S. Mill, Sismondi, and Proudhon, and as later influential contributors Walras, 
Weber, Cassel, Wieser, and Pigou. An important non-European figure in this later tradition was 
the early-Twentieth Century American J.M. Clark. All criticised, to various degrees, the 
development of classical political economy along the lines of a natural science following Smith, 
Ricardo, and others, with its ‘mechanical or mechanistic approach’ that ‘runs in terms of equilibria 
and gravitational movements’ (Nitsch 1990: 74).  All adopted as a guiding principle the idea that 
economic life is based on human relationships and direct association and social interaction between 
people. Thus, contrary to political economy’s epistemology, social values are deemed fundamental 
in economic life and economics – not only for explanations of local economic activity, but also for 
comprehending the economy as a whole.     
 
If market- and state-based forms of economic activity are inherently impersonal in-nature, because 
people interact at ‘arm’s length’ with people they generally do not know, community-based 
 
1 A special issue of the twelve most influential early papers in the Review of Social Economy from 1944 to 1999 
appeared in the journal in 2005.   
2 For extensive references to the large historical literature involved, see Nitsch (1987, 1990) and Lutz (1999).   
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economic activities are inherently more personal, because everyone more-or-less knows everyone 
else. Recognising this key difference, in turn, entails comprehending the divergent social values 
informing each economic activity. Markets and the state give precedence to reciprocity, justice, 
and freedom because these values apply to people irrespective of who they are. Conversely, when 
communities emphasise social provisioning, mutuality, and dignity, it is because these values 
apply to people because of who they are. If thinking in terms of markets and the state means 
improving how markets work and compensating people when they fail, respectively, cooperative, 
community-based economic organisations concern themselves with local needs as determined by 
fraternal groups, family ties, churches, and craft affiliations.3 
 
Social economic thinking, then, still accepts liberal values in its respect and concern for 
individuals, since communities are also embedded in larger societies and economies. Yet, in 
conceiving individuals as primarily members of communities, it simultaneously expands the range 
of social values needed to explain economic life. People are not abstract, atomistic Homo 
Economicus beings, but are who they are by virtue of their places, roles, and positions in particular 
communities. Early debates among advocates of social economics as a distinctive way of thinking 
thus focused on the relationships between liberal values and those social values grounded in 
community relationships between people. These fundamental concerns with value remain 
important to current social economics, albeit thinking about the social values associated with being 
part of a community has developed as the character of communities themselves has evolved. 
 
Social economics’ twentieth century development 
 
Voluntary, cooperative associations grew and evolved in Europe through the decades that followed 
World War One, and social economic thought continued to provide conceptual foundations for 
this movement. However, after 1945, social economics acquired an additional mode of expression 
and development within a burgeoning U.S. and Canadian academic economics that distanced itself 
from the newly dominant, market-centric neoclassical approach. It was still influenced by its 
earlier European origins and association with cooperativism. Indeed, Twentieth Century North 
America had itself seen considerable growth in cooperative associations.4 However, an additional 
source of third way thinking arose in reaction to the post-War U.S. economic profession’s turn 
toward a strong defense of markets.5 Thus, whereas earlier social economists had seen themselves 
as offering an alternative to classical political economy, post-War social economists in the U.S. 
and Canada saw themselves as offering an alternative to U.S. neoclassical economics.6   
 
Central to this later development in institutional terms was the formation of a professional 
association of academic social economists. Initially from American Catholic universities, in 1941 
these economists created the Catholic Economic Association (CEA), and founded what became 
 
3 See the special issue of the Review of Social Economy on community (Waters 1984). 
4 See Putnam and Garrett (2020: Ch. 4) for a review of the early twentieth century emergence of these forms in the 
U.S., many of which have endured to the present. They include: civic organisations, charitable activities, church 
groups, labor unions, credit unions, women’s movements, rural alliances, business and industry trade organisations, 
fraternal societies, children’s clubs, youth movements, and so forth. 
5 Interwar U.S. economics was more mixed in its views of markets and society. Institutional economists had a strong 
voice and argued for state intervention in the economy (see Rutherford 2011).  
6 For historical reviews of the development of post-War North American social economic thinking, see Waters (1990, 
1993) and Lutz (1990) 
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the leading journal in social economics, the Review of Social Economy.7 From the beginning, 
however, CEA membership was open to economists with different backgrounds and beliefs and 
included a diverse variety of theoretical approaches. Catholic social economists advocated 
solidarism, and drew especially on the writings of the German economist, Heinrich Pesch.8  
Institutional economists in the Veblenian and Ayres traditions were particularly influential, since 
they emphasised the diversity of institutional arrangements underlying markets.9 Similarly, 
Marxist economists demonstrated that class conflict, not economic harmony, was fundamental to 
the social organisation of capitalist economies.10 There were also communitarians, Keynesians, 
Kantians, public policy advocates, and others committed to making ethics central to economics.  
 
Over time, the CEA gradually dissociated itself from its Catholic origins and became an explicitly 
pluralist organisation.  In 1970, at a time of social upheaval in the U.S. associated with the Vietnam 
War and counter-cultural youth movements, the CEA changed its name to the Association for 
Social Economics (ASE) to reflect its more diverse nature and actively opened its membership to 
heterodox economists. Two developments reflected further changes in the ASE in the years 
approaching the new Millennium. 
 
First, during the 1990s, there was briefly debate within the ASE over whether its pluralism should 
accommodate neoclassicism. However, that debate died out as most neoclassical economists 
ultimately left the Association, thus affirming the ASE’s rejection of neoclassicism as foundational 
to social economics. Second, men had long dominated the ASE, with women’s importance in 
economics and the economy concomitantly neglected. Feminist economists, however, began to 
publish in the Review in the late 1980s and 1990s (eg. Ferber and Sander 1989; Ferber and Berg 
1991; Nelson 1993; Emami 1993; Figart 2005), which further extended the scope of Association 
social values to include the rejection of patriarchy.11   
   
Broadly, then, social justice and human dignity became unifying social values for the diverse range 
of approaches within the Association, such that social economics could be characterised as a 
‘humanistic economics’ (Lutz and Lux 1988; Lutz 1999) or a ‘real-life’ economics (Ekins and 
Max-Neef 1992). Yet, at this stage, little significant attention was accorded to questions of race,12 
nor the significant divide between rich and poor nations in the global economy.   
 
One factor that would eventually begin to influence the latter was the change in how the Review 
of Social Economy was published. From its origins, it had always been self-published by the 
CEA/ASE. However, in 1995, Routledge commenced publishing the journal and consequently 
 
7 In 1971, the ASE started a second journal, the Forum for Social Economics. A third social economics journal, the 
International Journal of Social Economics was also founded in the U.K. in 1974. See Showler (1974) in the inaugural 
issue of the latter for a statement of the meaning and content of social economics that characterises it as a ‘new’ 
approach with earlier antecedents.  
8 Pesch’s famous work was his Lehrbuch (Pesch 1905-23; see Mulcahy 1952; Mueller 1977). 
9 For a radical institutionalist expression of this current, see Dugger and Waller (1996). 
10 See the special issues of the Review of Social Economy devoted to Marx’s thinking (Waters 1979), especially the 
lead paper by Elliott (1979) and that on analytical Marxism by Elliott and Davis (1989). 
11 One reflection of this change was that the editorial team of the Review of Social Economy commencing in 2005 was 
balanced with two women – Deborah Figart and Martha Starr – and two men – Wilfrid Dolfsma and Robert McMaster.  
That principle has continued with subsequent editorships of the journal.  
12 Indeed, this continued to be the case until ASE president Stephanie Seguino made stratification economics an ASE 
conference theme in 2020. 
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promoted its international circulation (especially through networks of libraries and institutions).  
If submissions were still slow to come from the developing world, there was nonetheless increasing 
attention to international development and worldwide poverty. This gradually became a new 
dimension to social economics, whose origins and history had been framed by countries’ domestic 
economies. I turn below to social economics as a global social economics; but first, in the next 




Social Economics at the new Millennium 
 
Broadly, three factors united most social economists in the second half of the Twentieth Century , 
as reflected by what was published in ASE journals, in ASE membership, and in ASE conference 
presentations.14 
 
First, they accept Karl Polanyi’s argument that the economy is embedded in human society rather 
than vice versa (Polanyi 1944; see Stanfield 1989). Markets do not function independently of social 
relationships and people are not simply self-interested economic agents. The latter do not ‘behave 
or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them 
by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy’. Instead, they are 
‘embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations’ (Granovetter 1985: 487). 
   
Second, social economists thus reject the strong version of Chicago School neoclassicism that 
explicitly reduces social relationships to market relationships, and is built around extending the 
rational actor model. That view is especially well represented by Gary Becker, who applied this 
model to non-market domains of social life where it had traditionally not applied – such as his 
economics of the family, which treats children as investment goods and explains marriage 
according to comparative advantage (Becker 1981). In contrast, social economists argue that 
economics needs to prioritise the human person. This implies that the utility maximisation model 
of individuals as essentially self-interested should be abandoned, and a fuller conception of the 
person in economic life be developed in its place. Combined with Polanyi’s embeddedness view, 
this involves explaining how individuals are socially embedded beings rather than disembedded, 
atomistic individuals – a Homo Socialis or Homo Socioeconomicus rather than Homo Economicus 
(O’Boyle 1998; Danner 2002; Davis 2003). 
   
Third, social economists are also united in rejecting the increasingly strident positivism of post-
War mainstream economics. For social economists, economics is inherently value-laden, because 
it is built around values regarding how economic life contributes to social life. Indeed, the 
mainstream market-centric view of the economy depends on emphasising certain values and 
excluding others. Seeing the economy as embedded thus requires economic life be explained in 
terms of the full range of values operating in society. 
 
 
13 See also the special issue of the Review of Social Economy edited by James Henderson devoted to challenges facing 
social economists in the twenty-first century (Henderson 1993).  
14 It should be noted that the CEA joined the re-organised Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) in 1951 (Clary 
2008) and, accordingly, there is a long history of CEA/ASE conference presentations at the annual ASSA meetings.  
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Social economics for the Twenty-First Century15 
 
While social economics has historically explained economic relationships in terms of how 
communities organise economic life on a local level, the increasing integration of the world 
economy has meant that social economists have begun to operate with a more complex 
understanding of community. On this view, communities can extend across great distances, 
different cultures, and national boundaries when people see themselves sharing common 
experiences and circumstances. This has increased the importance of poverty and inequality, as 
well as sustainability and the environment as important issues for social economists, because these 
issues particularly affect local communities throughout the world. Communities, then, are still 
local in regard to people’s most immediate and familiar social relationships, but the well-being of 
people at this level around the world adds a second layer to how community is understood. 
 
Consequently, in addition to more traditional types of community, new types of long-distance 
community relationships have also emerged between people connected to one another by shared 
social values. One important manifestation of this particular concern to social economists is the 
growth and increasing reach of myriad non-profit, non-governmental institutions (NGOs) – such 
as the International Red Cross, Greenpeace, Médecins Sans Frontières, Save the Children – which 
have brought together people in NGOs and local populations in a new type of community. If the 
third sector was formerly associated with national economies, this interaction has produced a new 
type of international third sector with relationships to markets and states differing from those 
characterising national third sector organisations.   
 
One prominent example of this new expression of community is a United Nations organisation 
dedicated to promoting the well-being of the poorest people throughout the world: the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This third sector – transcending markets and states – 
effectively places people from many geographical locations in a single community under the 
manner of redressing global poverty. Specifically, the Human Development Index (HDI) of the 
UNDP has made the basic capabilities of people everywhere a matter of international concern, and 
made it possible to design development strategies oriented toward their improvement. From a 
social values perspective, this elevates justice and dignity as social values for many social 
economists due to their universal meaning. A global social economics thus redefines the concept 
of a community to internationalise the social values inherent in local communities. 
 
 
Social economic and mainstream economics policies towards markets and the relationship 
between ethics and economics 
 
There are two primary, interconnected practical issues dividing social economics and most 
mainstream economics: what policies ought to exist towards markets, and what is the relationship 
between ethics and economics? The first concerns the nature and status of markets in society; the 
 
15 The history of social economics since the turn of the millennium is still yet to be written. However, for an integrated 
review of topics and approaches, see the Elgar Companion to Social Economics (Davis and Dolfsma 2015); for four 
volumes of papers surveying the current state of social economics, see Dolfsma et al. (2016); and for a collection of 
papers specifically on global social economics, see Davis (2009). 
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second reflects on the nature and status of ethics to an economics primarily formulated around how 
markets work. Both issues can be understood in terms of whether the economy is embedded in 
society or society is embedded in the economy.   
 
 
Policies towards markets 
 
The first issue dates back to the origins of social economic thinking, and is no less important to 
contemporary social economics  For contrast, consider the standard neoclassical view of policies 
towards markets to which most mainstream economists adhere. If one believes society is 
embedded in the economy, and that one ought to model social relationships on economic 
relationships, then one is likely to understand policies towards markets solely in terms what would 
make the latter operate efficiently. Further, if one believes that all social relationships are 
ultimately economic relationships, one may also hold that markets operate efficiently most of the 
time, and that when they do not it is only because an external factor (usually government) has 
interfered with their operation. Policies towards markets in mainstream economics, therefore, are 
essentially aimed at freeing markets from social interference. A more moderate mainstream 
position is that markets themselves sometimes fail on their own, and that policies should 
additionally be designed to deal with market failure. Still, the goal is to make markets operate 
efficiently. 
 
Conversely, the social economic view denies that all social relationships are ultimately economic 
relationships and should be modelled as such. Social economists do not favour the complete 
elimination of market relationships; instead, positing that society should determine the extent and 
character of the market. On the one hand, where appropriate, this entails promotion and extension 
of the distinctive and valuable features of human life characterising non-market social 
relationships. On the other hand, it means resisting and reversing the erosion of these relationships 
due to the augmentation of markets.  
 
The social economic view of policies towards markets is, thus, concerned with setting boundaries 
on markets and influencing how they work. There are two primary ways in which this program 
has been pursued (see Davis, 2019): (i) the ‘moral limits of markets’ view, and (ii) the ‘taming the 
market’ view. Both strategies utilise social values that go well beyond mainstream economics’ 
utilitarian welfarist thinking and employ broader conceptions of human well-being. 
 
The ‘moral limits of markets’ view argues that normative principles cannot be modelled on the 
logic of market processes, that doing so is often ‘morally repugnant’ (Roth 2007), and that markets 
often ‘crowd out’ other normative principles. Thus, there are certain domains of social life that 
should simply be ‘off limits’ to markets. In effect, some things in life are ‘priceless.’   
 
We can distinguish two versions of this view. The first argues that market processes conflict with 
and are destructive of normative principles. Michael Sandel (2012) has made this argument in 
holding that there are some things that ‘money can’t buy’ – exemplified by the practice of slavery 
in directly placing a price on human life, despite most societies regarding this as morally 
repugnant. Equally, the commodification of life-saving drugs provided by large pharmaceutical 
companies may price them out of reach for those most needing them. The second variety of this 
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view posits that if we allow that normative principles indeed operate within markets, we should be 
concerned when these ‘crowd out’ and preclude other, equally valuable normative principles. For 
example, one might argue that market processes exhibit commutative justice (justice in exchange), 
but markets typically do not address distributive justice (socially equitable distributions of goods).   
 
The ‘taming the market’ view focusses on how markets themselves work and how they ought to 
be transformed to be socially acceptable. If the ‘off limits’ view aims to preserve ethical principles 
in a distinctive, independent part of human life, this approach aims to make existing markets 
function in an ethically acceptable way. In order to do so, proponents favour using economic 
policy: not to make markets work more efficiently according to their own logic, but to modify how 
they work to serve ethical goals. For example, ensuring that housing is non-discriminatory makes 
housing markets work in an ethically more acceptable way. Thus, if mainstream accounts of 
economic policy hold that it should be judged only on the basis of efficiency, the ‘taming’ view 
prioritises consideration of which values ought to prevail in markets and in what ways.  
 
Two different strategies may be delineated here: one aims at intervening in how market outcomes 
are produced (a direct strategy) and the other seeks to change the underlying conditions affecting 
market outcomes (an indirect strategy). The former employs such interventions as price controls – 
for example, price floors in the case of minimum wages and price ceilings in the case of rent 
controls – and also quantity controls, such as when air and water quality is protected by capping 
industrial pollutants or when regulations in workplaces exist for worker safety. The indirect 
strategy aims to influence the underlying conditions in particular markets though such measures 
as taxes and subsidies, along with those conditions affecting markets generally such as public 
expenditure and production of social goods. In effect, in the direct strategy markets are ‘tamed’ 
from within, while the indirect strategy ‘tames’ them from without. For most social economists, 
both strategies are motivated by the goals of improving social well-being, reducing the effects of 
social stratification, promoting equality irrespective of race, gender, sexual orientation, age, and 
religion, and sustaining democracy.      
 
 
The relationship between ethics and economics 
 
The second broad issue, the relationship between ethics and economics, is especially associated 
with the more recent development of social economics in reaction to post-War neoclassical 
positivism. Social economics has not been alone in addressing the relationship between ethics and 
economics, since other heterodox economics approaches share this concern – indeed, the status of 
ethics is a key consideration across the social sciences. Neoclassical positivism is addressed in the 
next section, while here the focus is placed on, first, what status ethics has in relation to economics 
and, second, how this relationship has been understood in terms of interdisciplinarity.   
 
Regarding the status of ethics and economics, the post-War professionalisation of science and 
academic research has sharpened and institutionalised differences between different disciplines, 
as they have come to possess their own research outlets, social structures, and standards for 
individual advancement. In practice, this has tended to fragment intellectual work, especially in 
social science. Working against this is the trend toward greater interconnectedness between 
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different kinds of social scientific investigations, as well as between descriptive and normative 
economics.   
 
In this context, one method to explain the current distance between ethics and economics is to 
identify the different roles historically fulfilled by economics, and then argue that increasing 
specialisation within science has led economics to largely adopt one role to the exclusion of others.  
Amartya Sen (1987) articulated this form of argument, distinguishing in the history of economics 
an engineering role concerned with how to achieve one’s ends, and a politics and ethics role 
addressing what ends people seek to achieve. For Sen, mainstream economics has settled almost 
exclusively on the former, but ought to reincorporate the latter. Others have subsequently 
elaborated on his plea for economics to adopt a new, broader identity, particularly in connection 
with the capabilities approach and its deeper conception of the person (see DeMartino 1999; van 
Staveren 2001; Crespo 2013).   
 
The relationship between ethics and economics may also be explained through examining how 
different disciplines relate to one another, and recommending alternative relationships between 
them. In this vein, Mark White (2018) has argued that economics and ethics is a cross-disciplinary 
field of investigation in which each, as separate disciplines, borrows from the other to serve 
independent disciplinary goals. Thus, there are actually two economics and ethics fields: one in 
economics and another in philosophy. Focussing on the former, White argues that because 
economics itself is divided between mainstream and heterodox approaches, the development of 
economics and ethics as a field in economics also follows two opposite paths. The path charted  
by heterodox economists rejects how the mainstream incorporates ethical concepts and normative 
reasoning into economics. Conversely, the path trailed by mainstream economists – which he 
labels ‘accommodationist’ – works to transform those concepts and reasoning so that they accord 
with the goals of standard theory, thereby distorting them and sustaining a strong divide between 
economics and philosophy. For White, reappraising the nature of ethical concepts and normative 
reasoning within economics would change this. 
  
Might the relationship between ethics and economics change in the future? Since the emergence 
of behavioral, experimental, and other new schools, economics has moved away from its post-War 
trajectory as a highly autonomous discipline to increasingly draw on other social sciences – a 
‘mainstream pluralism’ (Davis, 2006, 2008). Though there is considerable debate regarding the 
effects of this on mainstream economics, particularly on rational choice theory, a case can be made 
that economics will become more interdisciplinary in the future. For social economics, this 
development is important in that it may move economics toward a more serious appraisal of ethical 
concepts and normative reasoning, as well as a revaluation of the relationship between ethics and 
economics. Might the alternative vision of ethics and economics promoted by Sen or the re-
appraisal strategy of White provide the more influential pathway forward? The next section turns 
to some of the main methodological issues that would need to be addressed in each case. 
 
 
Methodological Issues: Positivism versus ‘entanglement’ 
 
The ‘accommodationist’ stance of mainstream economics toward ethics and economics has 
foundations in the assumption that all social relationships are ultimately economic ones. However, 
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David Hume’s (1739) famous thesis that ‘ought’ statements cannot be derived from ‘is’ statements 
also provides the basis for the mainstream’s positivist understanding of economics as a value-free 
science.  While Hume’s view was about the nature of language, mainstream economics extends it 
to the nature of science. This is questionable for a number of reasons.   
 
First, economics is also a policy science, so adopting the Hume thesis suggests that there is an 
unbridgeable gulf between positive and normative economics. The position of mainstream 
economics is that policy-makers can use the results of economic analysis as they choose and that 
this analysis implies nothing about what policies ought to be adopted. However, this misrepresents 
the close connection between economic analysis, formulated in terms of the efficient operation of 
free, competitive markets, and Pareto efficiency policy recommendations. Contrary to the idea that 
policy is carried out independently of economic analysis, standard economic analysis implies those 
Pareto recommendations.   
 
Second, standard economic formulations centred on the behavior of atomistic Homo Economicus 
economic agents reduces all social relationships to isolated interactions between self-regarding 
individuals. Social economists recognise many types of interaction and relations between people 
who can be other-regarding, caring, and altruistic, as well as self-regarding. What the purportedly 
positive economic analysis standard economics does, then, is determine what type of social world 
people ought to occupy – specifically, a neoliberal world – which depends on a particular set of 
values.  
 
On both counts, the standard economic claim to be value-free science masquerades for its 
particular value-laden view of the economic world. Simultaneously, while asserting itself to be 
value-free itself, the mainstream charges that alternative approaches explicit about their value 
foundations fall short as science because they are value-laden.  
 
Social economists thus argue that not only is economics a value-laden science but, as many have 
noted (e.g. Myrdal 1958; Boulding 1969), a scientific stance towards economic practice requires 
being explicit about the value assumptions informing one’s explanations.16 That economics is 
intrinsically value-laden was argued by philosopher Hilary Putnam (2002), based on a critique of 
Hume’s ‘is-ought’ distinction regarding language. Putnam demonstrated that ‘is’ statements often 
contain implicit value claims, so that though they may appear to simply describe the world and 
avoid value terms, language-users are well aware of these implicit meanings. Rather than being 
value-free, then, our ‘is’ statements are often ‘entangled’ with ‘ought’ statements. His famous 
example is: ‘The Roman emperor Nero was cruel.’ While, on the surface this is a value-free 
statement, understanding its meaning depends on comprehending the values people associate with 
‘cruel’ as a description of Nero. For Putnam, mainstream economics is consequently highly 
‘entangled’ with values it promotes at the expense of others it suppresses (see Davis 2015).   
 
Social economists seek to make this explicit and open up economics to an examination of the 
‘entanglement’ of values and economic life. This changes the nature of economic analysis itself, 
since how economists explain economic life differs according to their own ‘entanglement’ with 
values. Indeed, social economists’ original interest in a third sector of the economy – where people 
interact in cooperative ways, show trust for one another, and exhibit care toward others – was 
 
16 In this respect, social economics differs from the socio-economics (see Lutz 1990). 
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motivated by their belief that the values underlying these activities were important and often 
neglected or discouraged by the development of capitalism. The same is true of contemporary 
social economists interested in cooperative relationships in a global world economy. 
 
Furthermore, if we suppose that people are diverse and occupy very different social circumstances, 
then there also many different value foundations in economics and, correspondingly, myriad ways 
to conduct economic analysis. This contrasts with the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of mainstream 
economics, which assumes that people essentially correspond to rational individuals and that there 
is only one truly ‘scientific’ economics (thereby implicitly endorsing one set of values). Yet, 
economics is intrinsically a pluralistic science in virtue of its value-ladenness. Thus, while defenses 
of pluralism along methodological lines emphasise different theoretical commitments in 
economics (see Dow 1987), social economics stresses the links between those commitments and 
different economists’ normative allegiances .  
 
 
The main normative goals and social values of social economics 
 
Three main subjects of investigation in social economics can be distinguished: how economic life 
supports people’s livelihoods, the nature of social relationships in economic settings, and what the 
person is in economic life. These subjects, in turn, point toward three primary areas of normative 
concern for social economists: the nature of well-being, values in economic relationships, and the 
moral status of the person in economic life.   
 
 
The nature of well-being in economic life 
 
On the Polanyian embeddedness view discussed above, economic life is a means to maintaining 
and improving people’s well-being, not the purpose of life itself. While mainstream economics 
conceives of economic life in narrow terms as constrained by scarcity, social economists follow a 
long tradition in economics that frames economic life in terms of abundance (Peach and Dugger 
2006; Dugger and Peach 2009). From this perspective, the economy is a means of social 
provisioning – or a means of producing – not what people can afford, but what they need to live 
their lives both in and outside markets by drawing on the technologies and level of knowledge 
historically available at any given time. That is, the economy ought to promote not just better living 
standards and reduce poverty and inequality, but promote full human flourishing (Figart 2007).   
 
At first glance, this conception of social provisioning may appear no different from mainstream 
economics’ concept of welfare. However, there is a fundamental difference. The latter concept is 
formulated as the satisfaction of individual preferences, which are defined as isolated individuals’ 
private, subjective tastes. In contrast, the concept of social provisioning is based on comprehending 
people as social beings whose well-being transcends their private tastes, and includes the nature 
of their social relationships, concern for others, and their existence in communities in which they 
live. By comparison, the mainstream welfare concept only calls for markets to work optimally as 
if people’s lives was fully represented by their involvement in markets.   
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The mainstream representation of welfare in terms of private preferences is also a basis for 
declaring that economics should be value-free, because these are individual tastes, not social 
values. As a normative concept, welfare is extremely narrow: essentially limited to the libertarian 
notion that people should be free to pursue their own goals. This opens the door to malevolent and 
socially harmful tastes, which the concept of taste as private does not prohibit, and also forecloses 
encompassing within our understanding of well-being the diverse social values that people share. 
In contrast, social provisioning potentially encompasses all ideas about well-being and, thus, is 
able to evolve in what it values as social priorities also change. 
 
It is difficult, then, to state simply what social provisioning means in normative terms. One 
powerful principle which emphasises the centrality of community suggests that it entails 
promoting the common good (Lutz 1999), as open-ended as that can be. We might, however, resist 
searching for a single idea to capture what social provisioning involves if we wish to emphasise 
that communities themselves determine what they value. Sen (2005) has made this point in 
resisting Martha Nussbaum’s recommendation (2000) that we should identify a specific list of 
capabilities that together constitute the social good. This is supported by the fact that the HDI used 
by the UNDP to measure capabilities has changed and evolved since its original adoption to reflect 
both issues of measurement and developing perceptions of what is socially valuable.      
 
 
Values in economic relationships 
 
In mainstream economics, the only values exhibited by social relationships are market values 
because the former are assumed to be ultimately reducible to their market form. For social 
economists, market relationships are only a subset of broader social relationships, which exhibit a 
much wider range of social values. For instance, if a key social value promoted by market 
relationships is economic freedom, or that only an individual is ‘free to choose’ (Friedman 1962), 
freedom in a wider social sense also means being free from coercion and compulsion of all kinds, 
and having the capacity to act freely regardless of one’s circumstances. Similarly, while market 
relationships may promote justice in exchange, or commutative justice, social economics also 
posits the centrality of distributive and procedural justice – that is, whether resources, well-being, 
and opportunities in life are fairly and equitably distributed across people. Justice, in this latter 
sense, is indeed a pre-condition of commutative justice. 
 
Thus, while social interactions in markets are understood in mainstream economics as exchanges 
between equals, since goods are exchanged at a single price, these ‘equal exchanges’ can often be 
unequal when the people involved and their circumstances are asymmetrical. This produces two 
sets of social values promoted by social economists, associated with the two interpretations of 
social policy towards markets distinguished above: the ‘off limits’ and ‘taming the market’ views.  
For the first, if inequality in exchange is severe from a distributive justice perspective – as when 
exchanges are exploitive – markets should not be allowed to exist. For the second, when inequality 
in exchange is remediable, the functioning of markets should be changed to prevent this – either 
directly through such mechanisms as price controls, or indirectly by modifying underlying 
conditions affecting markets through such measures as the redistribution of wealth. 
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At the level of human motivation, social economists associate social values with how people orient 
toward one another in ways that transcend the ‘equals for equals’ principle of exchange. If that 
principle enforces a reciprocal relation between people, social economists also examine how 
people are motivated to act in a unidirectional manner toward others through caring (Davis and 
McMaster 2017) and gift relationships (Cedrini and Marchionatti 2017). Caring evokes the value 
of altruistic concern for others; gift relationships are built around values that create trust between 
people. Both reflect ways in which people directly interact with each other beyond systems of 
isolated market interactions. 
 
 
The moral status of the person in economic life 
 
Defenses of economic freedom are often coupled with defenses of the legal rights people need to 
participate effectively in markets. The wider sense of freedom defended by social economists 
entails a broader set of rights – human rights – that people need to secure their economic well-
being in and beyond markets. Human rights accrue to people on the same basis that narrower legal 
rights do: that people are entitled to pursue their livelihoods as best they can while not causing 
harm to others. Human rights, in this sense, are pre-eminently individual rights; but social 
economists also defend community rights, since they see the inexorable interrelation between 
people’s well-being as individuals and their lives in communities.   
 
Defenses of human rights are motivated by a deep social value: namely, that people have inherent 
value and are entitled to respect simply by virtue of being human. Social economists make this the 
central, anchoring value of life – economic and otherwise – and refer to it as the dignity of the 
person. In Kantian philosophy, people are ends in themselves, have intrinsic worth, and ought 
never be means to others’ purposes (White 2011). This means that ethics and economic policy 
ought always be organised around reducing human vulnerability and promoting people’s choices 
in life to the extent that this avoids causing harm to others (DeMartino, 2019). 
 
Respect for others as human beings also means respecting others’ choices in the expectation that 
people’s choices and lives can be diverse. That is, the value of human dignity involves valuing 
human diversity and differences between people. This is a shared human value in that what people 
have in common is not some single characteristic, but that people are all uniquely different from 
one another. What people have in common, that is, is their diversity. 
 
Overall, social economists’ social values are a reflection of, and also a normative foundation for, 
their analysis of economic life lived in close interaction with others – whether in local or more far-
reaching communities. Shared life with others thus not only invests all people with essential human 
dignity, but calls for an open, pluralist economic analysis. In this respect, social economics elevates 
and prioritises the ‘social’ in economic life and human life more broadly, and thereby offers a 
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